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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
BANKS

AND

BANKING-LIABILITY

OF SHAREHOLDERS-WHETHER

OR

NOT HOLDERS OF BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN A BUSINESS TRUST WHICH
OWNS STOCK OF BANK ARE SUBJECT TO SUPERADDED LIABILITY IMPOSED
STOCKHOLDERS OF INSOLVENT BANK-In Reconstruction Finance
Corporationv. Goldberg,' the facts disclosed that judgment had been
taken against the holder of record of certain shares in a closed bank
but that, pursuant to reservation of jurisdiction, certain members of
a syndicate organized as a business or so-called Massachusetts trust
were made additional parties defendant in order to impose liability
on them for the same shares. It appeared that the active control of the
trust business was in the hands of a managing committee of three
members, of whom appellant was one, which committee, on behalf of
the beneficiaries of the trust and in the course of authorized trust
business, had purchased shares of bank stock and caused the same to
be registered in the name of a nominee. The trust agreement contained a standard exculpatory clause which recited that neither the
managing committee, which was authorized to hold legal title to all
securities purchased, nor the members of the syndicate, should be perON

1143 F. (2d) 752 (1944).
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sonally liable for any debt or contract and that any one contracting
with the committee should look only to the trust property for satisfaction. It was urged, By way of defense, that plaintiff's election to
sue the holder of record had operated to release defendant, 2 and that,
as the bank stock was owned by the syndicate as an entity under a
valid trust, only syndicate funds could be subjected to obligations
arising out of ownership of the stock in view of the exculpatory
clause. Judgment for plaintiff on summary proceedings was affirmed
in the*Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit when that
court held that the double liability imposed by the Illinois constitution on stockholders of insolvent banking corporations 3 attached to
shareholders in a business trust, at least to the extent of their proportionate interests therein, and that the prior judgment against the
4
holder of record was not res adjudicata on the question.
In order to arrive at such decision, the court lacked substantial
precedent insofar as the shareholdings of a business trust might be
concerned although a line of cases 5 culminating in Anderson v.
Abbott6 have held stockholders in holding companies owning bank
stock liable as the beneficial owners thereof. In such cases, the courts
have had no hesitancy in "piercing the corporate veil" and finding
the shareholders in the several holding companies to be the beneficial
or real owners of the bank stock and liable thereon though it is true
that, in the majority thereof, the bank stock was the chief, if not the
only, asset of the particular holding company concerned and control
7
of the bank in question was the main purpose for its organization.
2 That issue had been determined, adversely to defendant's contention, in Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U. S. 349 at 354, 64 S. Ct. 531 at 534, 88 L. Ed. 535 at 538 (1944),
noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 284, particularly p. 287, note 18.
3 111. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6.
4The argument that Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Pelts, 123 F. (2d)
503 (1941), and Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Barrett, 131 F. (2d) 745
(1942), had been nullified by Trupp v. First Englewood State Bank, 307 Ill. App.
258, 30 N. El. (2d) 198 (1940), and Capetti v. Allborg, 319 Ill. App. 643, 49 N. E.
(2d) 795 (1943), was rejected on the ground that in the last mentioned cases no
attempt had been made to reserve jurisdiction over the cause. Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U. S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531, 88 L. Ed. 535 (1944), speaks more clearly on
the point.
5 Barbour v. Thomas, 300 U. S. 670, 57 S. Ct. 513, 81 L. Ed. 877 (1937) ; Nettles
v. Rhett, 94 F. (2d) 42 (1938); Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F (2d)
263, 103 A. L. R. 912 (1935) ; Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (1931); Fors v.
Farrell, 271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935) ; Simons v. Grosbeck, 268 Mich. 495,
256 N. W. 496 (1934) ; Nettles v. Sottile, 184 S. C. 1, 191 S. E. 796 (1937).
See
also McClanahan, Bank Stock Liability and the Holding Company Device, 19
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvrEw 160 (1941).
Illinois cases having bearing on the point
are Gahagan v. Whitney. 359 Ill. 419,_194 N. E. 581 (1935) ; Flanagan v. Madison
Square State Bank, 302 Ill. App. 468, 24 N. E. (2d) 202 (1939).
Of further interest is United States v. Gridley, 52 F. Supp. 398 (1943).
6321 U. S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531, 88 L. Ed. 535 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAw RTViEW 284.
7 Burrows v. Emery, 285 Mich. 86, 280 N. W. 120 (1938), however, indicates that
a different result might be achieved if the holding company is a bona fide organization possessing other assets beside the bank stock on which liability is sought
to be imposed.
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In view of the more or less settled law as to holding companies as
indicated by such cases, it is only to be expected and seemingly proper
for the court in the instant case to hold the shareholders of a business
trust liable upon its bank stock holdings on much the same theory.
If corporate structure does not serve to insulate from liability, certainly a mere trust agreement, no matter how valid the same might
otherwise be, should not.
Reliance was placed by defendant in the instant case on an exculpatory clause such as is usually found in trust agreements of the type
involved. The court indicated that as it was not shown that the
creditor of the insolvent bank had knowledge of the existence of such
clause, the same could not operate as a defense.8 Had the creditor
possesed knowledge and dealt with the bank in the face thereof, it
was said that the defendant still could not escape liability of the kind
in question for, just as legislation will not be permitted to defeat the
purpose of a constitutional provision imposing such liability,9 the
parties to the trust agreement could not extinguish or narrow the
same by the terms of their contract. While the latter statement was
pure dictum, it would seem sound for any contract violating a constitutional provision would be regarded as opposed to public policy.
It should be noticed, however, that such dictum could not apply as
to the ordinary creditors of a business trust for it has been held that
they may enforce their rights only pursuant to the terms of the trust
agreement. 10 In dealing with such an organization, they should be
held chargeable with knowledge of the terms of the agreement or else
be held bound to inquire into the same."

J.
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8 143 F. (2d) 752 at 757.

9In Sanders v. Merchants' State Bank, 349 Ill. 547 at 557, 182 N. E. 897 at 900
(1932), the court said: "No banking act can go into operation in this state of
which the constitutional provision in question shall not be a part. By virtue of
the inherent power of the Constitution itself, such provision is grafted into every
banking law which is passed by the Legislature or submitted to the votes of the
people."
10 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250, 58 A. L. R. 485 (1927);
Levy v. Nellis, 284 Ill. App. 228, 1 N. E. (2d) 251 (1936) ; Hunter v. Winter, 268
Ill. App. 487 (1932). But see Review Printing & Stationery Co. v. McCoy, 291 Ill.
App. 524, 10 N. U. (2d) 506 (1937).
:- In general, see Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. II, §§ 294-300.
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v. Domoney,' certain creditors of an Illinois state bank brought a
representative suit some time after the bank had been closed to enforce the stockholders' constitutional liability. 2 That liability was,
in due course, reduced to judgment against all shareholders within
the jurisdiction of the court and a receiver was appointed, who proceeded to collect a substantial amount of account thereof and made
distribution through the liquidating receiver of the closed bank.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition with the court requesting an
order directing the receiver in the shareholders' liability suit to sell
the uncollected portion of such judgment at public sale and to execute
proper assignment to the purchaser. An order for sale was entered.
More than thirty days thereafter,3 other creditors of the bank obtained
leave of court to move to vacate the order of sale on the ground that
the judgment involved belonged exclusively to the creditors of the
bank and was not assignable particularly in the absence of constitutional or statutory provision on the point.4 The trial court.agreed
that it lacked jurisdiction and vacated the order of sale. On direct
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because a construction of constitutional provisions was involved, that court reversed on the ground
that, as the liability of stockholders in a defunct bank was enforcible
in equity in a representative action, the absence of statutory authority
did not limit the general equity powers of the trial court which might,
for the purpose of making distribution of the assets, order its receiver
to compromise or sell the uncollected claims.
The decision-is one of significance as well as of first impression
in this state for it settles a point over which there has been some doubt.
It goes far toward facilitating the settlement and termination of representative suits which have dragged along to the point where the rule
of diminishing returns has now set in. 5 It suggests a practical pro1 387 Ill. 524, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 (1944). A comparable problem involving assignment of claim for stockholder's liability in a national bank was subsequently
presented in Wagner v. South Chicago Say. Bank, 146 F. (2d) 686 (1945), where
the majority of the court arrived at substantially the same conclusion. Major,
C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
2Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16 , § 6.
3 Such order would ordinarily be final after the expiration of thirty days from
the date of its rendition: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 174(1). The right to
move to vacate after the lapse of thirty days was said to rest on the fact that the
order was void for lack of jurisdiction: 387 Ill. 524 at 527, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 at
752.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16/2, § 11, was enacted to provide machinery for the
enforcement of the constitutional provision. That statute is silent as to the right
of the receiver in the liability suit to sell uncollected judgments although It does
authorize the liquidating receiver of the closed bank to take such action.
5 As the suit continues, it becomes increasingly difficult to collect any money at
all. It is scarcely worth the time and effort of the receiver, while the expenses of
the suit, receiver's fees, attorney's fees, etc., tend to exceed the amount collected. As
a consequence, the creditors cannot expect any appreciable benefit from a continuation of the suit and would, in the main, be better off by sale and distribution of the
sale proceeds.
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cedure to be followed for the closing of such cases, but whether it is
logically sound or not is another problem. 6
There are two lines of authority throughout the country on this
subject which present conflicting views. Under one of them, the
stockholders' liability evidenced by judgment is regarded in the
nature of a trust fund for the sole and exclusive benefit of the credi-.
tors and, although collectible by a receiver appointed in a representative suit, the latter may not assign or transfer either the claim or the
judgment arising therefrom. According to that view, the creditors
have exclusive title to the judgment while the receiver is merely an
officer of the court to accept satisfaction thereof. Lacking any title,
the receiver, cannot give any valid assignment. 7 Practical considerations are rejected under that view as not being in conformity with the
purpose of the statute imposing liability.8 In contrast, the rule pre.vails elsewhere that judgments rendered in stockholders liability suits
are assignable in the same fashion as other judgments, 9 although that
view is sometimes founded upon statutory authority. 10
While the Illinois court has seen fit to adopt the latter view in
the absence of statutory authority, the premises underlying its de6 Argument was advanced in the instant case that to permit the sale of such
judgments would be opening the door to potential fraud upon creditors by permitting sale at less than what might be collected thereon. The court herein disposed of that argument by saying that since the sale was to be conducted under
the direction and subject to the approval of the court and must be found to be
for the best interests of the creditors, such creditors were sufficiently protected:
387 Il. 524 at 530, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 at 753.
7 In Andrew v. State Bank of Swea City, 214 Iowa 1339, 242 N. W. 62 (1932),
an* order was obtained by a receiver to sell uncollected stock assessments which
lhad not been reduced to judgment. Such assessments were held unassignable on
the theory that they represented the sole and exclusive property of the creditors.
Subsequently, in Roe v. King, 217 Iowa 213, 251 N. W. 81 (1933), an attempt wasmade to distinguish that case from the holding in the, Andrew case on the ground
that the assessments had been reduced to judgment. Despite this, the court held
that the receiver could assign nothing. See also Hood v. Richardson Realty, Inc.,
211. N. C. 582, 191 S. E. 410 (1937) ; Griffin v. Brewer, 167 Oki. 654, 31 P. (2d) 619
(1934)'; American Exchange Bank v. Rowsey, 144 Okl. 172. 289 P. 726 (1930);
State v. Kelley, 141 OkI. 36, 284 P. 65 (1930). Textual treatment of the subject
may be found in Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 13, § 6499.
8 See, for example, Andrew v. State Bank of Swea City, 214 Iowa 1339 at 1346,
242 N. W. 62 at 65, where the court said: "Moreover, the enforcement of this
claim . . . cannot be justified upon any ground such as that it is economical to
gather up the tag ends of a receivership and dispose of them for whatever they will
bring at auction in order that the receivership may be closed. That reasoning
may be perfectly good as to property other than this special limited liability involved in this case. Such liability cannot be hawked at auction and sold to speculators for their individual aggrandizement, with little or no benefits flowing to the
stockholders. To do so would be to plainly circumvent .the manifest purpose of the
statute."
9.Waldron v. Alling, 76 N. Y. S. 250 (1902) ; Schaberg's Estate v. McDonald, 60
Neb. 493, 83 N. W. 737 (1900).
10 White v. Taylor, 187 Ark. 1, 58 S. W. (2d) 210 (1933).
The holding in Shaw
v. Strong (Tex. Civ. App.), ,35 S. W. (2d) 769 (1931), which denied a right to assign, was subsequently changed by statute permitting such- action: Hill v. South
Texas Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 73 S. W. (2d) 1043 (1934).
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cision are vaguely indicated by the statement that such authority is
said to rest on the general equitable powers of the court. The principle was laid down quite early in Golden v. Cervenka" that the liability of the shareholders imposed by the state constitution was designed for the sole and exclusive benefit of the creditors of the bank
to be enforced individually in an action at law 1 2 or collectively in a
representative suit in equity.' 8 For that reason, it was declared in
Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Company 14 that a receiver appointed
by the court in such a proceeding was merely the court's officer for
the purpose of collecting, receiving and disbursing the proceedsof
that liability and was not a party to and had no control over the
creditor's suit to determine the extent of that liability. That decision
would seem to indicate that the receiver, ,being only a representative
of the court and not of the creditors, would have no title to the cause
of action or to the judgment flowing therefrom. It should be noted,
however, that the court said he was not a party to the determination
of the stockholders' liability. After that determination, the creditorplaintiff conducting the suit could no longer settle his claim or agree
to a dismissal of the suit for by then the right of all the creditors had
become vested in the judgment which inured to their collective benefit. 15 By reason of the statute, collection or composition of the judgment so rendered can be made only by the receiver appointed in such
proceeding,' 6 but that fact does not vest title to the judgment in such
receiver. While the stockholders who have paid would seem to have
no interest in the distribution of the fund which they were compelled
to create for the satisfaction of their liabilities,' 7 it does not follow
that the receiver is entitled to that fund or to more than the right to
collect the judgment as the arm of the court which pronounced the
same. Distribution of funds collected by that receiver may best be
accomplished by delivering the same to the liquidating receiver of
the closed bank for ultimate payment to those entitled thereto, 8 but
iz

278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917).

That case emphatioally denies that the

liquidating receiver has any authority or right to enforce the constitutional liability.
12 Schalucky v. Field, 124 Ill. 617, 16 N. E. 904 (1888) ; Wincock v. Turpin, 96
Ill. 135 (1880) ; Culver v. Third Nat. Bank of Chicago, 64 Ill. 528 (1871).
13 Leonard v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197 N. E. 546, 101 A. L. R. 569 (1935).. But see
Zimmerman v. Zeimer, 363 Ill.
220, 1 N. E. (2d) 854 (1936).
14367 Ill. 196, 11 N. E. (2d) 6 (1937).
15 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 173.
16 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16'', § 11.
17 Comstock v. Morgan Park Trust & Savings Bank, 363 Ill. 341, 2 N. E. (2d) 311
(1936). But see Holderman v. Moore State Bank, 383 Ill. 534, 50 N. E. (2d) 741
(1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIa W 216, which indicates that the receiver can be directed to pay back funds remaining in his hands in excess of the
debts accrued.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 161/2, § 11, does direct that: "The funds so collected
... shall be distributed according to law among the creditors of said bank in such
manner as the court shall direct." See also Heine v. Degen, 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E.
832 (1936).
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authority to collect and distribute falls short of the power to assign
and pass title. 19
The court in the instant case said, in effect, that the judgments,
to the extent which they remained uncollected, were choses in action
and constituted a res under the jurisdiction of the court which, pursuant to its equity powers, could be sold just as it had power to
collect and distribute the funds arising therefrom. That authority,
if it exists, could not be drawn from the language of the statute for
the situation is not comparable to that in which a liquidating receiver
of the closed bank seeks to sell and dispose of its assets 20 nor is it
like that found in the case of the dissolution of an ordinary private
corporation. 21 It must, then, rest on certain alleged "general equity
powers."

The fundamental power of a court of equity to assert control
over property through a receiver is usually confined to taking possession thereof rather than title thereto.22 If any sale of such property
is made, it can be done only because the court has acquired jurisdiction over the res. 23 When that res takes the form of a judgment
which the court itself has pronounced, it is fundamental law that
jurisdiction over that judgment, as a species of property, can be exercised only for certain limited purposes such as acting to vacate or
review the same, to enforce the collection thereof, or entering satisfaction when satisfaction has been made. In all other respects, the
judgment is the property of the judgment creditor and may not be
taken from him except by due process of law.2 4 If the judgment runs
in favor of several persons, it may not be split between them so as to
permit one of them to exercise a right to redeem from an execution
sale or to permit him to make a fractional assignment thereof.2 5 Being joint property,2 6 it can only be dealt with by all of them acting
lO An attorney at law, for example, has no right to assign a judgment in favor
of his client in the absence of express authority: Schroeder v. Wolf, 227 Ill. 133,
81 N. E. 13 (1907).
See also Peacock v. Pembroke, 8 Md. 348 (1855).
No one
could validly claim that a sheriff, although he may collect and satisfy a judgment
pursuant to a. writ of execution, would be in a position to give an assignment of
such judgment without express authority from the judgment creditor. Both of
these officers are as much officers of the court as the receiver.
20 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 161/2, § 11, specifically gives such receiver the "title
to the books, records and assets of every description of such banks." See also
McIlvalne v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 314 Ill. App. 496, 42 N. E.
(2d)

93 (1942),

noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 3, cause transferred 371

Ill. 565, 21 N. E. (2d) 737 (1939).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.87.
22 Hooper v. Winston, Trustee. 24 Ill. 353 (1860).
See also Tardy's Smith on
Receivers, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, §§ 41-2.
23 Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 11. 150, 25 N. E. 680 (1890).
24 Burket v. Reliance Bank & Trust Co., 367 Ill. 196, 11 N. E. (2d) 6 (1937). 25 Chicago Trust Co. v. Dorchester Terrace Bldg. Corp., 317 Ill. App. 293, 45
N. E. (2d) 1001 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rsvmw 50.
26 Freeman, Judgments, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 173.
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jointly unless it might be said that, on proper application, 27partition
could be made or sale had because partition was impossible.

-

It is only on this latter theory that there might be any legal
justification for the conclusion reached in the instant case, but it does
not appear that any such application was made therein. Although
the decision is of doubtful validity, it must be acknowledged that the
outcome of the case furnishes a practical and expedient solution for
what might otherwise become an intolerable situation. If title to the
judgment could be transmitted only by assignment executed by all of
the judgment creditors, practical obstacles would be apt to defeat the
giving of such an assignment. Assuming such action was impossible,
the only alternatives would be to discharge the receiver when it reasonably appeared that further collection was unlikely, leaving no one
actively interested in the enforcement of the unpaid judgment, or else
retain the receiver in office until the judgment was ultimately extinguished by passage of time. Perhaps an exercise of vague "general
equitable powers" could, therefore, be said to be warranted.
R. BURDETT
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DEED

DELIVERED AFTER DEATH OF ONE OF CO-GRANTORS Is EFFECTIVE TO TRANSFER THE INTEREST OF THE SURVIVING GRANTOR-A

rather novel factual

situation was presented in the case of Creighton v. Elgin' recently
decided by the Illinois Supreme Court. It appeared that, in 1918,
one Creighton executed a deed to certain real property to his two
sons as tenants in common. The deed was also signed and acknowledged by the grantor's wife, although she owned no interest in the
property at that time other than an inchoate right of dower. That
deed was never effectively delivered during Creighton's lifetime but
remained in his wife's custody. Upon his death, his wife became
owner in fee of the property covered by the deed as sole devisee under
her husband's will. In 1936, she apparently delivered the deed to one
of the grantees and it was then recorded. After the death of one of
the grantees, Mrs. Creighton having died in the meantime, a suit for
partition was brought by such grantee's widow on the theory that the
subsequint delivery of the deed by Mrs. Creighton was competent to
convey her entire fee ,simple interest to the grantees, thereby giving
the plaintiff certain rights as sole devisee of such deceased grantee.
The trial court held the deed void for want of delivery during Mr.
Creighton's lifetime. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, being of the opinion that the deed was in form
27 Although statutory partition is confined to interests in land, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 106, § 1, equitable right to compel partition of personal property has been
recognized: Robinson v. Dickey, 143 Ind. 205, 42 N. E. 679, 52 Am. St. Rep. 417
(1896). See also 47 C. J., Partition, § 66; 40 Am. Jur., Partition, § 104.
1387111. 592, 56 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944).
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legally sufficient to convey the fee simple title to the property despite
the death of one of the grantors prior to delivery, although there was
some question as to the effectiveness of the purported delivery in
1936 which required a new trial.
. The question here presented can be simply stated as follows:
-IfA and B, as co-grantees, execute a deed to C and D as tenants in
common, but the deed is not delivered until after A's death, is such
deed competent to convey B's interest in the property although void
as to A's interest for want of delivery? If so, should the holding be
any different if B's rights or estate have been increased or enlarged
between execution and delivery?
There can be no argument as to the insufficiency of the deed
here involved to pass the interest of Mr. Creighton, for it is well
established that a deed which is not effectively delivered during the
grantor's lifetime is incapable of transferring the property after the
grantor's death. 2 No act of the grantee can complete the delivery
after that time.3 The logic for such rule lies in the fact that if a'
grantor wishes to convey real property by deed, he must effectively
deliver it while he lives; for if he intends the deed to become operative only in the event of his death, the instrument would amount to
an attempt to make a testamentary disposition and would be valid
only if statutory requirements as to execution and attestation were
4
*satisfied.
Just why a joint deed, on the other hand, should be rendered void
in its. entirety if not effectively delivered prior to the death of either
grantor is not too clear. Had the co-grantors, instead of joining in
the same deed, sought to accomplish their purpose by conveying
their respective interests through separate deeds, the death of one
grantor before delivery of his deed could not possibly affect the
validity of the deed of the other if it was properly delivered. There
is no patent interrelation between the two deeds which should operate to nullify both. Where, for convenience, both parties use the
same instrument to transfer the separate rights of each, there would
seem no logical basis for achieving any different result.
-While, after death of a co-grantor, the joint deed may contain
extraneous matter, e. g. the name of the deceased grantor, his signature, the description of any property which would not pass by such
deed, and the deceased grantor's personal covenants, still that provides no plausible reason why the entire instrument should be invalidated. Applying the theory that the instrument may be severable
2 Johnson v. Fulk, 282 Il. 328, 118 N. E. 706 (1918) ; Nofftz v. Nofftz, 290 Ill.
36,
124
N. E. 838 (1919) ; Ehrlich v. Tritt, 316 Ill.
221, 147 N. E. 40 (1925).
.8 Biggins
v. Lambert, 115 Il1. App. 576 (1904), affirmed in 213 Ill. 625, 73 N. E.
871, 104 Am. St. Rep.. 238 (1905).
4Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §§ 193-4. See also, for example, Rouland v. Burton,
296 Ill. App. 138, 15 N. E. (2d) 920 (1938).
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in its nature and need not stand or fall as a unit, it may be regarded
as valid in part although inoperative in part. 5 So long as the deed
satisfies the statutory requirements, contains the names of the grantor
bound thereby as well as the grantee, uses appropriate words of grant,
has an accurate description of the real estate conveyed, and bears the
signature of the surviving grantor, it should pass that grantor's estate.6 It need not be acknowledged as the words of the statute are
not mandatory, 7 nor is any exact or prescribed form of words necessary so long as an intention to convey is expressed.8 From pure
reasoning, therefore, the instant holding would seem correct particularly when it is remembered that every deed speaks only as of thetime of its delivery regardless of its date. 9
Reported cases from other jurisdictions on the exact issue here
involved are admittedly scarce. However, Schoenberger's Executors
v. Zook' ° is such a case. There, certain property owned by a woman
was to be conveyed by deed which she had signed and in which her
husband had joined. The grantee refused to accept delivery during
the woman's lifetime, but after her death took delivery from the
surviving co-grantor. The court held such deed was competent to
pass the husband's interest as tenant by the curtesy, although it declared that the conveyance did not affect the rights of the heirs of the
deceased wife who, upon her death, had succeeded to the reversion.
Decisions on the converse to that situation, and opposite to the
problem presented by the instant case, would serve to reinforce the
correctness of that holding. In Hopkins v. Slusher," for example,
a deed was made in favor of two grantees but was not delivered until
after the death of one of them. It was held to operate as a conveyance
to the surviving grantee, but only of such interest as he would have
taken had his deceased co-grantee survived the delivery. Direct-and
indirect precedent, therefore, sustain the instant decision at least as
to the first query.
On the remaining point, i. e. whether the deed was sufficient to
transfer only the inchoate interest held by the surviving grantor on
the date of the deed or would serve to pass the interest later acquired'
5]Payne v. The Mayor of Brecon, 3 H. & N. 572, 157 Eng. Rep. 597 (1858).
Analogous cases may be found with reference to the effect of an alteration made
by one party upon the obligations of another party contained in the same deed:
Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. VI, § 1888. As to partial enforcement of valid
portions of contracts partly tainted by illegality, see Williston, op. cit., Vol. V,
§ 1660.
6 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 30, § 8.
7 Ibid., Ch. 30, § 19.
s Cross v. Weare Commission Co., 153 Ill. 499, 38 N. E. 1038, 46 Am. St. Rep.
902 (1894).
9 Totten v. Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920) ; Bearss v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16
(1883) ; MacVeagh v. Chase & Sanborn, 67 Il1. App. 160 (1896).
1034 Pa. St. 24 (1859).
11266 Ky. 300, 98 S. W. (2d) 932, 108 A. L. R. 662 (1936).
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the law is much clearer. Although, at time of signing, it may have
been the intention of the surviving grantor to pass only an inchoate
interest, the effective date on which to measure the true intent is
that on which delivery takes place. 12 At that time the surviving
grantor in the instant case knew she held a larger interest for she
had, in the interim between signing and delivery, conveyed portions
of the described premises. Under the circumstances, therefore, the
surviving grantor's intent must have been to transfer the interest she
then possessed. That the deed then described more property than the
surviving grantor owned would not of itself render the conveyance
nugatory nor affect the title of the innocent interim purchasers. 13
If, therefore, the deed concerned in the instant case was, in fact,
eventually delivered, a holding that it was operative to convey the
interest of the surviving co-grantor was justified.
M. C. MAITLAND
EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS -APPOINTMENT,

AND TENURE-WHETHER

QUALIFICATION,

OR NOT HOSTILITY TOWARD DISTRIBUTEES

AF-

FECTS COMPETENCY OF PERSON OTHERWISE ENTITLED TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR-In

Dennis v. Dennis,' the court was asked to determine the

right of one son, named Jacob, to be appointed administrator with

the will annexed of the mother's estate as opposed to the appointment
of a nominee of another son, named Frederick, who had been named
as executor thereunder but was disqualified from acting by reason of
his confinement in the penitentiary.2 Under the father's will, his
entire estate had been given to Jacob after a life estate in favor of
the mother and Frederick had been disinherited. The mother, deeming that an injustice had been done to her wayward son, renounced
the provisions of that will and claimed her statutory share in fee.
She thereafter, by will, devised such share to Frederick. Upon her
death, rival petitions for appointment to administer her estate were
filed by the two sons. The county court, finding that a long-standing
animosity existed between the two sons and that Jacob had made no
accounting of the father's estate, appointed Frederick's nominee.
That order was reversed by the Circuit Court upon the ground that
although there was a great conflict of personal feelings there was no
such adversity of legal interest as to require the disqualification of
Jacob, as a member of a class, in favor of a mere nominee. 3 On appeal,
12

13

See cases cited in note 9, ante.
Doe ex dem. McConnel v. Reed, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 117 (1842) ; Brown v. Banner

Coal & Oil Co., 97 Ill. 214 (1881).
1 323 Ii. App. 328, 55 N. E. (2d) 527 (1944).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 229 and § 246, declares that a person convicted of
a crime rendering him infamous is not qualified to act as executor or administrator.
3 As to preference between a member and nominee of a member, see In re
Marco's Estate, 314 1ll. App. 560, 41 N. E. (2d) 783 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 194.
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the Appellate Court for the Fourth District reversed the circuit court
and remanded with directions to appoint Frederick's nominee because
it found that the hostile feeling between the two brothers amounted
to a sufficient conflict of interest to warrant such action. 4
No clear precedent for such action exists in Illinois for it was
heretofore regarded as necessary that, in order to pass over a member
of a class in favor of a nominee, the member had to be disqualified
by reason of some actual legal adverse interest to the estate over which
he sought to administer 5 or else had demonstrated his unfitness by a
failure to observe his duties in managing the affairs of another and
related estate. 6 While it is true that Jacob had not performed his
duties as administrator of the father's estate with technical precision, 7
there was no showing that he had been guilty of mismanagement nor
did it appear that he had any claim against the mother's estate which
might render him incapable of acting in a disinterested' fashion.8
The sole conflict, therefore, had to lie in the animosity of personal
feeling which existed between the two sons.
There is no doubt that, under the law of other jurisdictions,
antagonism toward those interested in an estate may be taken into
consideration when determining the fitness of a person to act as
administrator or executor, 9 for the right of interested parties to have
an impartial and equitable distribution of the estate is the dominant
one and ascendant over the right of any particular individual to
administer.' 0 An antagonistic and hostile feeling must actually exist,
however, for mere prejudice toward the distributees will not serve
to disqualify,1 ' and that unfriendly or hostile feeling must be -of
such character as would be likely to prevent the management of the
estate in accordance with the dictates of prudence and in the interest
12
of the heirs, devisees and creditors.
Cases do exist which declare that mere personal hostility toward
a distributee will not necessarily serve to disqualify one from acting
as personal representative of an estate, but on analysis they reveal
4 Although Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 246, does not impose such test to determine qualification, that view was engrafted by Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336 (1869).
5 See, for example, Heward v. Slagle, 52 Ill. 336 (1869).6 Justice v. Wilkins, 251 Ill. 13, 95 N. E. 1025 (1911).
7 It did appear that no account had been filed therein although he had served as
administrator for som twenty-one months, and petition to compel him to report
had become necessary, but the estate appeared to be a complicated and substantial
one and the delay might have been justified: 323 Ill. App. 328 at 331 and 338, 55
N. E. (2d) 527 at 528 and 531.
S On that point, see Stines v. Brock, 185 Ill. App. 22 (1913).
9 Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294, 6 A. L. R. 1340 (1919) ; Nickels
v. Horsley, 126 Va. 54, 100 S. E. 831 (1919).
10 Ex parte Small, 69 S. C. 43, 48 S. E. 40 (1904).
11 In re Wright, 177 Cal. 274, 170 P. 610 (1918) ; In re Bauquier's Estate, 88 Cal.
478, 26 P. 373 (1891).
12 Stevens v. Larwill, 110 Mo. App. 140, 84 S. W. 113 (1904).
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that, as in Davis' Administrator v. Davis,13 the alleged hostility lay

more nearly in the nature of a lack of interest in the heir or legatee
rather than one of hatred, 14 or else, as in Barnett's Administrator v.
Pittman,15 represented a conflict of financial interests. In only one
case, that of Dooley v. Dooley,", does it appear that a clearly contrary
holding to that in the instant case was reached. There rival petitions
for administration of an estate were presented by two brothers, each
being supported by an equal number of the other children, but the
court upheld the right of one brother to administer, despite his enmity
toward Some of the other children, on the ground that such children
were protected by the official bond required of the administrator in
case of any mismanagement of the estate. In contrast to such paucity
of authority, many decisions support the proposition that hostility
toward distributees will justify the disqualification
of a person other7
wise entitled to act as an administrator.
Practical considerations governing the appointment of an administrator would seem to support the decision in the instant case as well
as the holdings in other jurisdictions which subscribe to the principles followed therein. Certainly, when the chief beneficiary of the
estate is confined in the penitentiary, he needs the assistance of a
wholly disinterested and loyal person to watch over his interests and
should not be forced to rely solely on an official bond.
M.

MUNICIPAL
WHETHER

CIVIL

CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS,
SERVICE

EXAMINEES,

AGENTS,

WRONGFULLY

AND

C.

MAITLAND

EMPLOYEES-

REFUSED

CERTIFICA-

TION AND APPOINTMENT, MAY RECOVER WAGES FOR THE ELAPSED PERIOD
BETWEEN MANDAMUS ORDER AND ACTUAL APPOINTMENT-In the case of

Corbett v. City of Chicago,' plaintiffs had taken and passed civil
service examinations for positions as police clerks. Having been re-

fused certification and appointment, they instituted mandamus proceedings and were granted a peremptory writ in 1941. The defendant
city appealed from such decision, but the same was affirmed by the
162 Ky. 316; 172 S. W. 665 (1915).
14 The court noted that the allegedly disqualified person was the paternal grandfather of the child, lived just across the street, but had rarely seen the child, had
never exhibited any interest in or solicitude about its welfare, and, in fact, had
entertained some doubts as to its paternity: 162 Ky. 316 at.319, 172 S. W. 665 at
666.
15 282 Ky. 162, 137 S. V. (2d) 1098 (1940).
16 240 S. W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922).
17 In re Tracy's Estate, 214 Iowa 881, 243 N. W. 309 (1932) ; Hunt v. Crocker,
246 Ky. 338, 55 S. W. (2d) 20 (1932) ; In re Drew's Appeal, 58 N. H. 319 (1878) ;
Ellis v. Ellis, 42 N. D. 535, 174 N. W. 76 (1919) ; In re Estate of Schmidt, 183 Pa.
St. 129, 38 A. 464 (1897) ; In re Warner's Estate, 207 Pa. 5S0, 57 A. 35, 99 Am. St.
Rep. 804 (1904) ; In re Fleming's Estate, 135 Pa: Super. 423, 5 A. (2d) 599 (1939)
In re Pike's Estate, 45'Wis. 391 (1878).
1323 Il. App. 429, 55 N. E. (2d) 717 (1944).
13
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Appellate Court and leave to appeal was denied. 2 ' Plaintiffs were
finally certified and appointed in 1942. They thereupon filed the present suit, seeking to collect wages for the period from the date of the
original peremptory writ to the actual time of appointment. Plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendant's amended answer, which relied
on the defense of payment to de facto incumbents, was allowed and
judgment for the salary accrued was awarded plaintiffs. On appeal
from that judgment, the Appellate Court for the First District affirmed on the ground that payment of the wages to de facto employees
during the contested period was not a good defense.
The precise question presented by the instant case does not appear to have been before any Illinois reviewing court, nor before the
courts of any other jurisdiction. Proper consideration of the controversy can, therefore, only be obtained from" a review of allied problems. The situation is directly analogous to cases involving the
wrongful removal of civil service employees. In cases of that type,
the decisions of the Illinois courts present a pattern which is kaleidoscopically confused. One of the early cases, that of City of Chicago
v. LuthardtA responsible for much of the subsequent confusion, dealt
with the general question of the right of a wrongfully removed employee to obtain compensation for the period of his removal. When
deciding that the employee had the right to such compensation, the
court said: "The legal right to the office carried with it the right to
the salary or emoluments of the office. The salary follows the legal
title."' 4 There was, however, clear implication in that decision that
payment to a de facto employee would have constituted a good defense. So, even at the inception of the "title theory" in this state,
qualifications were apparently recognized.
Some time afterward, the Supreme Court again had occasion to
speak on this problem. In Bullis v. City of Chicago,5 it reiterated
the doctrine of the Luthardt case and even strengthened it by a
further statement to the effect that the salary follows the legal title
and not the occupation and exercise of the duties of the office. Yet
it again gave tacit recognition to the exception that actual payment
to a de facto employee should be regarded as a good defense. That
fundamental doctrine appeared to be so settled that, in a subsequent
case, 6 the question of the right to compensation was decided without
further discussion.
Ultimately, 'however, the Supreme Court was brought face to face
2 See People ex rel. Corbett v. Allman, 312 Ill.App. 484, 38 N. E. (2d) 810
(1942). Leave to appeal denied: 316 Ill. App. xiv.
-3191 Ill. 516, 61 N. E. 410 (1901).
4 191 Il1. 516 at 523, 61 N. E. 410 at 412, quoting from Andrews v. City of Portland, 79 Me. 484, 10 A. 458, 10 Am. St. Rep. 280 (1887).
5235 Ill. 472, 85 N. E. 614 (1908).
6 People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 105 N. E. 1 (1914).
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with a situation which involved actual payment of the salary to a
7
de facto employee who had served during the period of removal.
For the first time, the court recognized that there existed serious
disagreement throughout the country over this question.8 Nevertheless, with a cursory reference to the "title theory" of the Luthardt
case, it decided that such payment was no defense. Illinois was thereby aligned, at least for a time, with the distinct minority of the
American jurisdictions.
That problem again came before the Supreme Court in People
ex rel. Sartison v. Schmidt,9 where it at last received the intelligent
discussion which it merited. The relator therein had been wrongfully
removed and sought reinstatement and compensation for the period
of his removal. The defense of payment to a de facto employee was
raised. The court, without regard to the holding in People-ex rel.
Blachly v. Coffin, 1 considered the question to be one of first impression in Illinois. It proceeded to a discussion of the law in other
jurisdictions as well as a learned and intelligent dissertation of the
compelling public aspects of the problem. Upholding the defense of
payment to a de facto employee, it said: "We are of the opinion
that payment to a de facto public officer of the salary of the office,
made while he is in possession, is a good defense to an action brought
by a de jure officer to recover the same salary after he has acquired
or regained possession."" The court was careful, however, to add a
necessary qualification to such holding by saying: "If the salary or
compensation has been paid in good faith . . . it cannot . . . be recovered. .... ,,i2 There should be little doubt as to the validity of that

proviso, for the sovereign ought not be protected when it acts in
bad faith. In its opinion in the Schmidt case, the court considered
all of the previous utterances on the subject, distinguished the problem from that in the Luthardt and Bullis cases, and necessarily rejected the Coffin and Brady cases, even though, with judicial courtesy,
it refrained from a direct refutation of the latter. Shortly afterward,
however, in People ex rel. Durante v. Burdett,13 it reaffirmed such
holding and expressly overruled the Coffin case.
The controversy then appeared to be well-settled, but it arose
again to confront the court in People ex rel. McDonnell v. Thompson.14 This time, the point of attack centered on the "good faith"
7

People ex rel. Blachly v. Coffin, 279 Ill. 401, 117 N. E. 85 (1917).

s See annotation to Hittell v. City of Chicago, 327 Ill. 443, 158 N. E. 683 (1927),

in 55 A. L. R. 997 for a very thorough analysis of this point.
9 281 Ill. 211, 117 N. E. 1037 (1917).
10 279 Ill. 401, 117 N. E. 85 (1917).
11 281 Ill. 211 at 215, 117 N. E. 1037 at 1038. Italics added. It is interesting to
note that the court's reference to "acquired or regained," impliedly recognizes the
essential similarity between a wrongful removal and a wrongful failure to appoint.
12 281 Ill. 211 at 217, 117 N. E. 1037 at 1039. Italics added.
1 283 Ill. 124, 118 N. E. 1009 (1918).
14 316 Iii. 11, 146 N. E. 473 (1925).
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referred to in the Schmidt case. Plaintiff therein was seeking compensation not for the entire period of his removal but for the time
which had elapsed between the entry of the order directing his reinstatement and the actual restoration to the position. The court
awarded compensation, referring to a "well-defined exception" to the
doctrine of the Schmidt case. The result was justified both in law
and in policy, but the reasoning of the court could hardly be called
compelling.
Probably because of the weakness of the reasoning in the Thompson case, the next time the question arose, as it did in Hittell v. City
of Chicago,15 the Supreme Court was obliged to consider the problem
of good faith at some length. It re-examined the statement in the
Schmidt case and gave it approval. Explanation for such view was
provided in the following words: "The exigencies of society require
efficient performance of official duties, and to secure such performance prompt payment therefor is an essential requisite. Disbursing
officers of municipalities are not clothed with judicial power to
determine whether or not a person vested with the indicia of an office
and performing the duties of such office is, in fact, a de jure officer,
where there has been no judicial determination of such fact." 6 By
that statement, the court provided not only an explanation as to what
was the good faith required of the sovereign by the Schmidt case but,
more important, why protection for acts done in good faith was
necessary. The necessity for judicial determination of the right to
office before bad faith could be said to exist was emphasized when
the court said: ". . in no case where the question was involved do
we find that it has been held by this court that proof of the good faith
of the payment to the de facto employee was a requisite element of
such defense prior to a judicial determination as to which was the
17
de jure employee."
It appears, therefore, that the present doctrine in Illinois regarding this situation is that payment of the interim salary to a de facto
employee will ordinarily constitute a good defense. If there has been
a judicial determination of the right to office, however, the municipal
employer must also show good faith as an essential element of its
defense. The question of good faith was not raised in the instant
case, but it would seem clear that, had it been raised, the court could
have held that good faith was lacking as a matter of law.' 8 It is true
that the municipal defendant argued that a decision of a lower court,
during pendency of an appeal, was not, in point of law, a judicial
determination of the right to office until the appeal had been finally
15 327 Il1.

443, 158 N. E. 683 (1927).
16 327 I1. 443 at 447, 158 N. E. 683 at 684. Italics added.
17 327 I1. 443 at 445, 158 N. E. 683 at 684. Italics added.
is Holdings from other Jurisdictions supporting such view may be found in 55
A. L. R. 997 at 1013.
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determined. To support such argument, it contended that to hold
otherwise would be to penalize the city for exercising its right to
appeal. That argument was refuted, and correctly so, when the
Appellate Court pointed out that, using the analogous situation of an
unsuccessful appeal from a money judgment followed by the imposition of interest from the date of the judgment in the lower court,
any penalty suffered was the consequence of the lack of success on
appeal. The mere pendency of an appeal from a judicial determination of a right to office cannot, therefore, be deemed sufficient to
justify a claim of good faith in refusing to appoint or restore to
appointment while the municipal employer continues to pay the
salary of the office to another.
An interesting problem is thereby posed to the officials of the
municipality, for if the appeal is unsuccessful they will have incurred
a duty to make double compensation. That problem is not insurmountable, however, for upon entry of the order for appointment or
reinstatement in the lower court, the city could comply by discharging the interim employee and offering the position to the successful
plaintiff. It might still appeal and, if the decision of the lower court
was affirmed, the plaintiff would merely continue in office. Should
the lower court's decision be reversed, the city could then remove
the plaintiff from office and reinstate the interim employee. The
latter could have no claim against the city for compensation during
the period of his removal for, by the clear-cut law of Illinois, the
municipality could use the defense of payment in good faith to a
de facto appointee. In either eventuality, therefore, the city would
suffer no penalty for exercising its right to appeal. If it should be
urged that, by abiding by the order of the lower court, the municipality had lost its right to appeal, 19 the appointment of the plaintiff
could be made on a temporary basis until the disposition of the
20
appeal.
A. BAUM
PAWNBROKERS AND MONEY LENDERS-WHo
MONEY

LENDERS-WHETHER

OR

NOT
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OCCASIONAL

ISOLATED

LOAN CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS WITHIN MEANING OF "SMALL

AND
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LOAN

the recent case of Snyder v. Heinrichs,' the Appellate Court of Indiana was
called upon to construe the meaning of the Indiana Small Loan Act
as it applied to the business of making small loans. 2 The litigation

ACT" SO AS TO SUBJECT LENDER TO THE PENALTIES THEREOF-In

therein arose after the borrower had defaulted on a promissory note
for $200 calling for twenty-four per cent. interest, given to a lender
19 Freeman, Judgments, 5th.Ed., Vol. II, p. 2406.
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 9-16.
1- Ind. App. -, 55 N. E. (2d) 332 (1944).
2

Burns' Ann. Stat. 1933,

§§ 10465-8.

§

18-3001 to

§

18-3004; Baldwin's Ann. Stat. 1934,
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whose principal occupation was that of tavern owner and operator.
It appeared that similar loans had been made by plaintiff to the
borrower's step-son on two occasions, but the evidence disclosed theri
to be more or less isolated transactions. The borrower contended that,
as the plaintiff had not complied with the terms and conditions of the
Small Loan Law and possessed no license to loan money at more than
ordinary rates, the lender should forfeit both principal and interest.
Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of the principal sum without
interest was affirmed when the court concluded that the Small Loan
Law applied only to persons who "engage in the business" of making
loans at interest in excess of ordinary rates and that plaintiff was not
in that category. By so doing,-the court set a precedent for that state
which does little more than add to the general confusion as to what is
meant by the language of statutes, now found in a majority of states,
purporting to regulate the so-called "small loan" business.
In order to arrive at that decision, the Indiana court relied on
cases which define the words "doing business" but which are based
3
on statutes entirely irrelevant to the problem in the instant case,
4
although one case, that of Stevens v. Grossman, might be said to
have some bearing since in it a note given to a contractor for a balance
due was enforced although he was not licensed under the Small Loan
Act, despite the fact that it called for more than ordinary interest,
because the contractor was said not to be engaged in the loan business.5 If the act in question be designed solely to regulate persons
who make small cash loans as a regular business, then it should not
apply to the occasional lender.
In this state, the Illinois Supreme Court, after upholding the
constitutionality of a statute which is almost identical with the Indiana Act, 6 decided one criminal case based upon an alleged violation
thereof where it indicated that its views would accord with those of
the Indiana court in the instant case for it there said: -"The object
of the law is not to regulate the rate of interest, but ... is to regulate
the business of making loans of small sums of money to wage earners
and salaried people."' 7 The Appellate Courts of Illinois, however,
are not in agreement on the subject for that of the Fir*st District,
First Division, hasi held a single loan on an automobile, secured by
chattel mortgage, will bring the lender within the penalty provisions
a Vandalia R. Co. v. Stilwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. 289, Ann. Cases 1916D 258
(1914) ; Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F. (2d) 417, 139 A. L. R. 1013 (1942).
4 100 Ind. App. 417,
5 Lockwood, Adm'r

196 N. E. 123 (1935).
v. Woods, 3 Ind. App. 258, 29 N. E. 569 (1892), was said to
require disallowance of the usurious interest but not the forfeiture ot the prin-

cipal.

. 6 Laws 1935, p. 925; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 74, § 19 et seq. The former statute,
Laws 1917, p. 553, was held constitutional in People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118
N. E. 87 (1917).
7 People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159 at 174, 118 N. E. 87 at 92 (1917).
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of the act if there is a failure to secure a license,8 although the First
District, Third Division, has reached an opposite holding on a similar
Issue. 9 The debt at usurious interest must be one for money loaned,
though, for the taking of a note to cover the cost of certain automobile
repairs has been held not to be the sort of transaction or business
10
regulated by the statute.
The inference contained in the instant case that the lender must
be in the sole business of, or at least devote a substantial portion of a
varied business to, loaning money before he comes within the purview
of such statutes seems to be borne out by other cases. It has been
held, for example, that the act does not apply to persons loaning
money to laborers to be paid back on pay-day;" to jewelers loaning
money on warehouse receipts;12 to garageman being paid a single
repair bill in installments -with interest;13 to a lender securing an
isolated loan by a chattel mortgage ;14 to a person in the pawnbroking
business but making only one loan;15 to a lawyer occasionally loaning
money on notes secured by second mortgages;16 and to commercial
banks.1 7 In contrast, it has been held that the Small Loan Act does
apply to Morris Plan banks or to companies doing a similar business ;2s to loans made by an insurance agency which coerced borrowers
into the purchase of insurance ;19 to licensed security dealers who purchase wage assignments;20

to retail merchants who do likewise;21

22
and has been held to apply to a single transaction.

8 In Ranning v. Peyser, 259 Ill. App. 152 at 154 (1930), the court said: "The
statute . . . has been construed to mean that even a single forbidden transaction
makes the lender guilty of a violation of its provision."
"This
9 The court, in Turk v. Bender, 273 Ill. App. 84 at 86-8 (1933), declared:
is the one and only loan ever made by the plaintiff . . . and there is no proof that
plaintiff was in such business. We hold the statute in question has no application
here."
"The statute is
10 People v. Morse, 270 Ill. App. 207 at 210 (1933), states:
clearly applicable only to a case involving loaning money. It should not . . . include an arrangement whereby a bill for repairs may be paid In Installments."
11 Means v. State, 75 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 953 (1934).
12 City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 118 Ill. 632, 8 N. E. 812 (1886).
13 People v. Morse, 270 Ill. App. 207 (1933).
14 Turk v. Bender, 273 Ill. App. 84 (1933).
15 In Craddock v. Woods, 60 Ga. App. 377 at 380, 3 S. E. (2d) 924 at 926 (1939),
the court said: "Being in the loan business and making one loan . . . does not
demand the inference that plaintiff was doing business under the Small Loan
Act." See also Levison v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P. 825, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 575
(1907).
In Rice v. Garnett, 17 Ala. App. 239, 84 So. 557 (1919), the court did
indicate, however, that the evidence might be sufficient to make this a question for
the jury.
16Zirkle v. Daly, 54 F. (2d) 455 (1932).
17 The Small Loan Act has been held inapplicable to banks in City of Allentown
v. Personal Finance Co., 19 Leh. L. J. (Pa. Com. P1.) 247 (1942).
1s Whaley v. State, 176 Tenn. 170, 139 S. W. (2d) 255 (1939).
19 Commonwealth ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., Inc., 275 Ky. 238, 121 S. W.
(2d) 49 (1938), condemned the practice on the ground that it was a device to
obtain a rate of interest in excess of ordinary rates.
20 State ex rel. Ormes v. Tennessee Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 45, 269 S. W. 1119
(1925).
21 Costello v. Great Falls Iron Works, 59 Mont. 417, 196 P. 982 (1921) ; Koen v.
State, 162 Tenn. 573, 39 S. W. (2d) 283 (1931).
22 Rice v. Franklin Loan & Finance Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 P. 223 (1927).
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It can be seen, then, that there is a lack of uniformity on the question although perhaps the majority of cases would free the isolated
lenider from the rather severe penalties of the Small Loan Act and
impose on him only the milder consequences of the ordinary usury
laws. Such would seem to be more in accord with the philosophy
behind such legislation, but the language thereof is unfortunate for
it poses the question as to when one ceases to be an occasional lender
so as to make conformity with the act necessary. Uncertainty in the
law of Illinois on this point remains to be solved although there is
some reason to believe, from the cited illustrations, that the courts
of this state would absolve the occasional usurious lender if his principal business was not allied to that usually associated with pawn
brokers and money lenders.
A. LUDWIG
PAYMENT-RECOVERY

OF PAYMENTS-WHETHER

MONEY PAID WITH

FULL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND IGNORANCE ONLY OF LEGAL RIGHTS MAY
RECOVERED IN
ABSENCE OF COMPULSION-In the recent case of
Western & Southern Life Insurance Company v. Brueggeman' the
Appellate Court of Illinois had occasion to give utterance to a sometimes overlooked rule of law when it denied recovery of money paid
under mistake. In that case, an insurance company sought to recover
an overpayment made on a life insurance policy containing a military
service exemption clause. 2 Through inadvertence, and while having
in its possession the full story of the insured's death while in military
service in time of war, the company paid the full face value of the
policy. Demand for the return of the erroneous overpayment was
refused and suit followed. Judgment in the trial court for the defendant was affirmed, the Appellate Court saying: "The general rule
seems to be that a payment made, with full knowledge of the facts
and in ignorance only of legal rights cannot be recovered back." 3
BE

It would appear at first blush, from that statement, that one who
inadvertently hands over two $100 currency notes instead of one in
payment of a debt for $100 may not sue as in general assumpsit for
money had and received to recover the overpayment. Such a rule,
however, would completely abrogate the basic doctrine of quasi-contract which, being equitable in nature, is predicated upon the theory
that defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience he ought not be permitted to retain.4 Unless, therefore, he
'323 Ill. App. 173, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 (1944).
2 The clause read:
"In the event the insured dies while in Military or Naval
Service in time of war, the liability of the company shall be limited to the amount
of the premiums paid on this policy, with Interest thereon at the rate of three per
centum per annum."
3323 Ill. App. 173 at 178, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 at 721.
4 Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760).
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can show a right to keep it, the money should be returned. Payment
made and received by reason of a mistake of fact of the kind 5 thus
illustrated provides clear basis in equity for the return thereof.
Confined to ,its proper limits, however, the rule so stated seems
to be well established that a voluntary known and intended payment
made to one under a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the
facts and in ignorance only of legal rights, cannot be recovered provided that there is no fraud or compulsion tantamount to duress.
Such rule appears to have been given its earliest utterance by the
eminent Lord Ellenborough in a case very similar in facts and principles to the instant case, 6 and has since been affirmed both in England 7 and the majority of the American courts.8 Illinois has followed
that majority without a single case of exception.f
The instant case, however, appears to go farther in its application
of the doctrine for the court held that the insurance company had
waived its rights to assert the military exemption clause by the mere
act of mailing a check for the full face value of the policy to the
beneficiary. It cannot be said that the company clearly intended. a
waiver for its attention was seemingly concentrated on a suicide
clause contained in the same policy and the military exemption clause
was overlooked. But the modern trend would seem to be that courts
will find a waiver or estoppel against an insurance company whenever
5 Pool v. Allen, 29 N. C. 120 (1846).
An underwriter there
16Bilby v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (1802).
sued to recover payment on the ground, that defendant had failed to disclose to
plaintiff a material letter relating to the transaction. Defendant proved that
plaintiff had possession of the letter before the policy was adjusted and the money
paid. The contents of the letter disclosed a good defence on the policy. Recovery
was'denied when the court found a voluntary payment present even though plaintiff acted in ignorance of his legal rights.
7 Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143, 128 Eng. Rep. 641 (1813); Currie v. Goold,
2 Madd. 163, 56 Eng. Rep. 295 (1817) ; Martin v. Morgan, 1 Brod. & Bing. 289, 129
Eng. Rep. 734 (1819) ; The East India Co. v. Tritton, 3 B. & C. 280, 107 Eng. Rep.
738 (1824) ; Bramston. v. Robins, 4 Bing. 11, 130 Eng. Rep. 671 (1826) ; Stevens v.
Lynch, 12 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 16 (1810). See also 22 Eng. & Emp. Dig. 161;
35 ibid 158-9.
8 See, for example, Utermehle v. Normant, 197 U. S. 40, 25 S. Ct. 291, 49 L. Ed.
655 (1905); Lamborn v. Dickinson County Com'rs, 97 U. S. 181, 24 L. Ed. 926
(1878) ; Detroit Edison Co. v. Wyatt Coal Co., 293 F. 489 (1923) ; Taylor, Jr., &
Sons v. First Nat. Bank, 212 F. 898 (1914) ; Kundsen-Ferguson F. Co. v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 149 F. 973 (1906); Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265
(1861) ; Lester v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 29 Md. 415 (1868);
Deveraux v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 98 N. C. 6, 3 S. E. 639 (1887) ; Shuck v.
Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 63 S. C. 134, 41 S. E. 28 (1902); Mayor &c of
Richmond v. Judah, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 305 (1834) ; Haigh v. U. S. B. L. & L. Association, 19 W. Va. 792 (1882).
9Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200 (1908)
People v. Foster, 133 Ill. 496, 23 N. E. 615 (1890) ; Union Building Ass'n v. City
of Chicago, 61 Ill. 439 (1871); City of Chicago v. Stuart, 53 Ill. 83 (1869) ; Stover
v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 213 (1867) ; Bryan v. Pilgrim Nat. Life Ins. Co., 294 Ill. App.
356, 13 N. I. (2d) 850 (1938); Sando v. Smith, 237 Ill. App.. 570 (1925).
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it has done anything inconsistent with the provisions of the policy
which have been inserted therein for its benefit.' 0
There may be some justification for such a view when an insurance company waives a defence which it might have asserted to a
suit by the beneficiary as, for example, because of his failure to file
proofs of loss within the specified time, but it is quite another matter
to hold it to a waiver which results in the creation of a liability in
the first instance. Waiver of a defence presupposes the existence of
a liability which might have been avoided, so that payment under
such circumstances might be said to involve no inequity on the part
of the recipient calling for its return. A waiver of the type claimecl
in the instant case, however, creates a liability which was never there
so long as the provision in question remained to confine the risk.
Receipt of payment when no debt is due or owing would certainly
seem to justify proceedings for the recovery of the amounts so paid.
The court met this problem by adding to the rule aforementioned the
additional words:

".

.

. and proof that the one making the payment

was, in fact, under no obligation to pay, and the other had no right
to receive the payment, is of no consequence."'" By so doing, it
appears to have extended the rule for it previously had been confined
so
as to require that the recipient of the payment must have had some
claim
of right thereto, however colorable, and the payor must
have
2
been under some obligation to pay.'
Opposition to such holding may be found, but it represents a
distinctly minority view and turns upon the fact that the voluntary
payment must have been made with such full and actual knowledge
as would support the idea of either a conscious waiver or else a gift
of the amount of the overpayment. Leading exponent of that view is
the Alabama case of Franklin Life Insurance Company v. Ward"
wherein the court said:

".

.

. money voluntarily paid with full knowl-

edge of the facts cannot be recovered, but having the means of ascertaining the real facts is not tantamount to actual knowledge of such
L0Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Dowdall, 159 Ill. 179, 42 N. E. 606 (1895) ; Manufacturers' & Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. 'Armstrong, 145 Ill. 469, 34 N. E. 553
(1893); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 599, 22 N. E. 489 (1889):
Beddow v. Hicks, 303 I1. App. 247, 25 N. E. (2d) 93 (1940); Eagleton v, Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 193 Ill. App. 306, abst. opin. (1915) ; Cox v. The American
Ins. Co., 184 Ill. App. 419 (1913).
11 323 Ill. App. 173 at 178, 55 N. E. (2d) 719 at 721.
12 Compare the instant case with that of Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone
Co., 234 Ill. 535, 85 N. E. 200 (1908), where the quoted language was used in con-

nection with the plaintiff's contention that it was under a business compulsion,
hence the payment was not a voluntary one. • See also City of Chicago v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Ill. 40, 75 N. E. 803 (1905) ; Gannaway v. Barricklow, 203 Ill. 410, 67 N. E. 825 (1903) ; Yates v. Royal Ins. Co., 200 Ill. 202, 65 N. E.
726 (1902) ; Pemberton v. Williams, 87 Ill. 15 (1877) ; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. C., V. &
W. Coal Co., 79 Ill. 121 (1875) ; Elston v. City of Chicago, 40 Ill. 514 (1866).
1 237 Ala. 474, 187 So. 462 (1939).
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facts."'1 4 Similar holdings may be found in other cases arising in the
same state 15 or in Michigan 16 but there is a notable absence of decisions in other jurisdictions. That minority view, however, has an
appeal to the sense of fairness and equity.
In view of the fact that the contract of insurance in the instant
case called for payment of the face amount upon the death of the
insured but expressly limited liability in the event the insured died
while in military service to the return of premiums paid with interest,
the maximum legal and equitable obligation of the company under the
circumstances was to refund the premiums paid. In equity and good
conscience, therefore, the mistaken payment of any excess over that
figure, in the absence of actual and conscious knowledge that an overpayment was being given, ought fairly to be recoverable. To impose
a penalty of the magnitude herein involved for an honest mistake,
whether attributable to an insurance company or a human being,
seems far too harsh to comport with basic principles underlying the
remedy of quasi-contract.
S. L. EHRLICH
WILLS -

RIGHTS

AND

LIABILITIES

OF

DEVISEES

AND

LEGATEES

-

WHETHER THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT OF A SPECIFIC DEVISE PURSUANT TO
COURT ORDER FOR THE BENEFIT OF AN INCOMPETENT TESTATOR WORKS AN

ADEMPTION THEREOF-The courts of this country are not in accord

upon the question whether the sale of the subject of a specific devise
by a court order for the benefit of an incompetent testator works an
ademption thereof. The Supreme Court of Illinois had occasion, in
the recent case of Lewis v. Hill,' to examine into that problem for
the first time. The facts therein showed that the testatrix, by her
last will and testament, devised certain real estate to the plaintiff. A
few years after making such will, the testatrix was adjudged to be
incompetent and defendant was appointed conservator of her estate.
The conservator filed a petition to sell the real estate in question on
the ground that the sale was necessary to provide money for his
ward's care. Sale was ordered and the property was sold in due

course.
14

Testatrix died shortly thereafter and her will was admitted

237 Ala. 474 at 481, 187 So. 462 at 467.

15 Roney v. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co.; 225 Ala. 367, 14-3 So. 517 (1932)
Beasley v. Beasley, 206 Ala. 480, 90 So. 347 (1921); Traweek v. Hagler, 199 Ala.
664, 75 So. 152 (1917) ; Ledger Pub. Co. v. Miller, 170 Ala. 437, 54 So. 52 (1910) ;
Merrill v. Brantley, 133 Ala. 537, 31 So. 847 (1902) ; Hemphill v. Moody, 64 Ala.
468 (1879); Young & Son v. Lehman, Durr & Co., 63 Ala. 519 (1878); Town
Council of Cahaba v. Burnett, 34 Ala. 400 (1859) ; Rutherford v. Mclvor, 21 Ala.
750 (1852).
16 Truax v. Bliss, 139 Mich. 153, 102 N. W. 635 (1905) ; Pingree v. Mutual Gas
Co., 107 Mich. 156, 65 N. W. 6 (1895); Lane v. Pere Marquette Boom Co., 62
Mich. 63, 28 N. W. 786 (1886).
1387 Ill. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944), affirming 322 Ill. App. 68, 53 N. E. (2d)
736 (1944). See also another aspect of the same case in 317 Ill. App. 531, 47 N. E.
(2d) 127 (1943).
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to probate, defendant being appointed executor thereof. At that
time, defendant reported a balance of money on hand.
Plaintiff,
devisee under the will, then brought suit in the circuit court to impress a trust on such fund to the extent of the sale price on the theory
that the sale of the real estate did not operate to adeem the specific
devise of that property to her and prayed that defendant be ordered
to pay plaintiff such sum in the due course of administration. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, among
other things, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 2 and that the devise
to plaintiff was adeem'ed. After denial of such motion, the court
found in plaintiff's favor. Such decree was affirmed both in the Appellate Court and by the Supreme Court on certificate of importance.
In arriving at the conclusion that an ademption did not take place,
the Illinois Supreme Court had to engraft an exception on the general
rule prevailing in this state to the effect that where a specific article
of property is bequeathed or devised and such article is lost, destroyed, or disposed of by the testator during his lifetime, so that it
is not in existence or does not belong to him at his death, there is an
ademption or extinguishment of such bequest or devise.3 While the
court recognized that the real estate of the testatrix in the possession
of her conservator constituted assets to be used, if necessary, for her
support and for the payment of her debts; yet, if the conversion of
the real estate into personalty was made for the sole purpose of hersupport and benefit, the fund produced by the sale, or any unexpended
balance thereof, could not be regarded as personalty for the benefit
4
of residuary legatees.
The rule'seems to have prevailed in some of the old English cases
that whether an ademption took place or not was a question which
turned on the intention to be imputed to the testator, the courts
2 The Appellate Court held that action in the circuit court was proper for the
reason that, by tracing the proceeds of the sale into the hands of the executor,
the plaintiff's attempt to impress the fund with a trust brought the controversy
within the general equitable jurisdiction of that court: 317 Inl. App. 531 at 533,
47 N. D. (2d) 127 at 128.
3 Lenzen v. Miller, 378 Ill. 170, 37 N. E. (2d)
833 (1941) ; Tanton v. Keller, 167
Ill. 129, 47 N. E. 376 (1897).
4 The court said: "The governing principle in the management of property belonging to a person of unsound mind is the furtherance of his interest. Therefore,
his property may be converted from realty Into personalty whenever it appears to
be for his interest to do so, regardless of the contingent interests of the real and
personal representatives or the interests of those who may have the eventual
rights of succession." See 387 Ill. 542 at 546, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 at 621. But the
court likened the problem to that which arises when an executor sells real estate
of the testator for the payment of his debts. In such case, the conversion of
realty into personalty is completed to all intents and purposes only to the extent
to which the purchase money is required for the particular objects for which
the sale takes place and the excess, though in the form of money, remains Impressed with the character of real estate for the purpose of determining who is
entitled to receive it: Smith v. Smith, 174 Ill. 52, 50 N. E. 1083, 43 L. R. A. 403

(1898).
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thereby adopting the animus adimendi of the civil law. 5 Since Lord
Thurlow's decision in Ashburner v. MacGuire,6 however, the English
courts have generally held that the only test to apply in cases involving ademption by extinction is: (1) was the legacy specific, and (2)
was the subject of the legacy in existence at the testator's death and
did he then own it.
If the legacy was specific and if the subject
thereof was sold or destroyed before the testator died, or not then
owned by him, it was adeemed and the legatee lost the legacy, in
whole or in part.7 Much the same view has been held by some of the
American courts, at least in cases which did not involve the subsequent mental derangement of the testator s
On the precise point here concerned, some of the English cases
have held that, aside from the effect of any controlling statute, an
ademption of a specific legacy will occur where, after the insanity of
the testator occurs, the thing bequeathed or devised is converted by
his conservator having legal authority to represent him without regard
to whether or not the proceeds are preserved as such until the testator's death. 9 No ademption occurs, however, when the conversion
has been made by one without authority, particularly if the proceeds
have been set apart and preserved up to the time of the testator's
death. 10 Three other English cases have declared that an actual intention on the part of the testator is an essential element of ademption, especially where the subject of the bequest has been sold, invested, or changed in some manner by a party who purports to represent the testator in such transactions but is acting without his authority.1 ' To eliminate hardships which had arisen by reason of the
application of the general doctrine to cases involving incompetent
testators, a statute known as the Lunacy Act of 1890 was enacted in
England which purports to treat the fund created by the conversion,
or any balance thereof, in the same fashion as if conversion had never
taken place.' 2 In one case arising since that statute, however, the
5 See Justinian, Inst., lib. II, tit. xx, § 12.
6 2 Bro. C. C. 108, 29 Eng. Rep. 62 (1786).

See Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 11.
8 Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911) ; Unitarian Society v. Tufts,
151 Mass. 76, 23 N. E. 1006 (1890); Hosea v. Skinner, 67 N. Y. S. 527, 32 Misc.
653 (1900).
9 In re Freer, 22 L. R. Ch. Div. 622 (1882) ; Jones V. Green, 5 L. R. Eq. 555
(1868).
lo In re Larking, 37 L. R. Ch. Div. 310 (1887).
11 Jenkins v. Jones, 2 L. R. Eq. 323 (1866) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Hare 475, 68
Eng. Rep. 1014 (1853) ; Basan v. Brandon, 8 Sim. 171, 59 Eng. Rep. 68 (1836).
12 53 and 54 Vict., c. 5, § 123(1). It provides: "The lunatic, his heirs, executors, administrators, next of kin, devisees, legatees, and assigns, shall have the
7

same interest in any moneys arising from any sale, mortgage, or other disposition,

under the powers of this act which may not have been applied under such powers
as he or they would have hfd in the property the subject of the sale, mortgage, or
disposition, if no sale, mortgage, or disposition, had been made, and the surplus
moneys shall be of the same nature as the property sold, mortgaged, or disposed
of."
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same was held insufficient to protect the rights of a legatee to whom
a bank deposit had been bequeathed when, under order of court, such
deposit was paid into court and invested pursuant to its direction
because it was said that the operation of that statute had to be confined to cash balances on hand at time of death and could not apply
3
to other kinds of property.'
In this country, Pennsylvania applied the objective test of the
English courts quite early 14 and in 1853 extended its application to a
case concerning an incompetent testator by expressly denying that
ademption was a question of intention of the testator, either explicit
or implied. 15 In New York, on the other hand, it had at one time been
held that the intention theory could be invoked in cases involving
incompetent testators, and, by reason of such incompetency, no ademption could arise. 16 The highest court of that state, in 1931, in a case
concerning an incompetent testator, repudiated that view and decided
that a specific legacy was adeemed since the lack of intent on the part
of the testator was immaterial.' 7 After noting that the bequest therein
of certain preferred stock was a specific legacy and, as such stock was
not in existence at the time the will took effect, there had been an
ademption or withdrawal of the gift, the court said: "In the absence
of statute, there is no power in the courts to change a specific into a
general legacy or turn over the balance of the proceeds derived from
the sale of the specific property to the legatee in place of the particular thing intended to be given ... The rule as it existed at common law, and still exists, admits of no such exception."' s
13 In

re Walker, 2 Ch. Div. (1921) 63.
14 In Blackstone v. Blackstone, 43 Pa. (3 Watts) 335 (1834), a bequest of bank
stock was made in a will but, subsequent to execution, the same was exchanged for
a bond with the declared intention of keeping the bond for the legatee in lieu of
the stock. Ademption was found for reasons paramount to all considerations of
intention, and the legacy having ceased to exist in specie, no matter how its extinction was caused, neither the bond taken as a substitute for it, nor its value,
could be demanded from the executor.
15 See Hoke v. Herman, 21 Pa. St. (9 Harris) 301 (1853). The court, at p. 305,
said: ". . . if a thing bequeathed in a will by such a description as to distinguish
it from all other things be disposed of, so that it does not remain at the death of
the testator, or if it be so changed that it cannot be called the same thing, the
bequest is gone. If such legacy be of a debt, payment necessarily makes an end of
it. The legatee is entitled to the very thing bequeathed if it be possible for the
executor to give it to him; but if not, he cannot have money in place of it. This
results from an inflexible rule of law applied to the mere fact that the thing bequeathed does not exist, and it is not founded on any presumed intention of the
testator."
16 Snedecker v. Ellis, 241 N. Y. S. 563, 136 Misc. 607 (1930) ; In re Garlick's
Estate. 161 N. Y. S. 1113, 96 Misc. 653 (1916) ; In re Carter, 130 N. Y. S. 201, 71
Misc. 406 (1911).
17 See In re Ireland's Estate, 257 N. Y. 155, 177 N. E. 405
(1931), noted in 1
Brooklyn L. Rev. 127, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 710, 9 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 506, and 41 Yale
L. J. 101. The opinion of the lower court, 231 App. Div. 288, 247 N Y. S. 267
(1931), was commented upon favorably in 16 Corn. L. Q. 623, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
990, and 17 Va. L. Rev. 584.
18 257 N. Y. 155 at 158, 177 N. E. 405 at 406.
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Cases arising in the states of New Jersey, 19 Missouri,2 0 New
Hampshire, 21 and Michigan, 2 2 as well as in the federal court sitting in
this state, 23 however, have held that no ademption occurs in cases of
this type because of the necessity of an intention to adeem which
would be absent in the case of an incompetent person. The unfairness
to a legatee caused by applying the objective test is clearly revealed
in those cases where the property has been converted or changed in
character by paramount law without any act on the part of the testator. In one such case, 24 the devised realty was taken by an exercise
of the power of eminent domain, yet it was held that the devise had
been adeemed. It was said that such holding was justified because
the testator could have changed his will after the condemnation of the
particular parcel of property. Such argument could not apply to
cases wherein the testator has become incompetent since making the
original devise for he would, legally, be unable to make a new will.
Although the conservator should have the right to make changes
in investments, and even to sell property to secure ample funds for the
care of his ward, yet, if the general doctrines of ademption are allowed
to prevail, he could favor one legatee over another by choosing to dispose of a particular parcel of property instead of, some other asset.
Justice would seem to demand, as was decided in the instant case,
that an exception to the theory of ademption should be allowed.

H. H.

FLENTYE

19 In re Estate of Cooper, 95 N. J. Eq. 210, 123 A. 45 (1923), noted in 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 1141.
20 Buder v. Stocke, 343 Mo. 506, 121 S. W. (2d) 852 (1938) ; Lamkin v. Kaiser,
256 S. W. (Mo. App.) 558 (1923), noted in 24 Col. L. Rev. 405; National Board v.
Fry, 293 Mo. 399, 239 S. W. 519 (1922).
21 Morse v. Converse, 80 N. Ramp. 24, 113 A. 214 (1921).
22

In

23
24

Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 F. 896 (1910).
Ametrano v. Downs, 170 N. Y. 388, 63 N. E. 340 (1902).

re Barnes' Estate, 162 Mich. 79, 127 N. W. 37 (1910).

